University of New Mexico

UNM Digital Repository
NotiCen

Latin America Digital Beat (LADB)

10-2-1987

Vice President Addresses Circumstances Leading
To Peace Accord, Risks For Nicaragua In
Implementing Accord
Deborah Tyroler

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/noticen
Recommended Citation
Tyroler, Deborah. "Vice President Addresses Circumstances Leading To Peace Accord, Risks For Nicaragua In Implementing Accord."
(1987). https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/noticen/970

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Latin America Digital Beat (LADB) at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NotiCen by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu.

LADB Article Id: 076028
ISSN: 1089-1560

Vice President Addresses Circumstances Leading To Peace
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In a recent interview with PRENSA LATINA in Managua, Nicaraguan Vice President Sergio
Ramirez Mercado addressed several issues regarding the timing and content of the Central
American peace accord signed Aug. 7, and his government's risks in implementing the accord.
Excerpts from the interview follow. PL: In Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America, political
analysts were taken by surprise by the peace accord signed Aug. 7 in Guatemala. What is your
interpretation of how this consensus [among the five presidents] was achieved after years of
disagreements that prevented the signing of previous accords? Ramirez: First of all, I believe the
Reagan administration's Central America policy is crumbling, and has been discredited. A principal
reason is the contras' military failure in Nicaragua. The crux of this military adventure by the
US was a conviction that the contras could get quick results. The expected weeks and months
of fighting have turned into years with no end in sight... After years of fighting, the effects of
the war the contras' presence in countries such as Honduras and Costa Rica are perceived as a
nuisance. The contra presence creates tensions in border areas and is affecting the economies of
other Central American nations. Next, there is the contragate scandal. For some US allies, it was
no longer profitable to support Reagan's Central America policy. A change in Central American
governments' political will was also important. Presidents Oscar Arias of Costa Rica and Vinicio
Cerezo of Guatemala decided to demonstrate independence. This was clearly evident when, as
the presidential summit began in Guatemala City, the Reagan administration proposed its own
peace plan. As in the past, Washington ignored the fact that there is a sense of dignity in Central
America which cannot be buried, ignored. Reagan's proposal was rejected. because it proved
the Central American countries' independent will before Washington's enormous capacity for
pressure and blackmail... PL: Contadora and its Support Group seem to have been revitalized by
the signing of the peace plan. What are the prospects for joint projects among the eight nations
(Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela) and the Central
American countries? Ramirez: Contadora and its Support Group have already been assigned a
supervisory role in the peace process at a recent meeting in Caracas, Venezuela. On Sept. 16 and
17 in Managua, the eight nations' technical team began work on the content of the international
verification commission's supervisory activities. Indeed, the existence of the commission and certain
deadlines it will have to meet are important aspects of making the peace plan a reality. accord in
Guatemala would not have been possible without the previous continual efforts on the part of the
eight Latin American countries. We had been discussing peace plans with diplomats from these
nations for some time, and through the years, Contadora proved that it was possible to choose an
independent course, or even a course contrary to that desired by the US government. Things have
changed since the Organization of American States (OAS) meeting in 1960, when all nations in the
hemisphere with the exception of Mexico joined with the US in its decision to break off relations
with Cuba...The US would have liked to achieve a similar isolation of Nicaragua. Washington not
only failed in this venture, but also aroused Latin American nationalism. Nicaragua has become
a testing ground for the continent's resistance to the most extremist US policies. position made
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a...change in the attitude of Central American governments possible. Resistance to US pressure by
Central American countries is more difficult than say, for Mexico, Brazil or Venezuela. The solidarity
of the region's eight largest and economically strongest nations with Central America in many ways
made our resistance to Washington's policies possible. PL: The signing of the peace accord has been
perceived both as a diplomatic victory for Nicaragua, and as a great political risk for the Nicaraguan
government. What is your assessment of the risk factor? Ramirez: All international diplomatic
negotiations in such a complex framework necessarily bring risks. We are taking them. We decided
to sign the document, convinced that there is no other way to attain peace. We prefer peace to other
risky situations, such as the present one where we have a war that every day causes many deaths,
a lot of material damage and great poverty. In addition, as long as the US-backed contras remain
active, we cannot rule out the risk of a direct US military invasion. If through negotiations, the
Reagan administration is forced to accept concrete outcomes resulting from fulfillment of deadlines
in accordance with US preferences, the US can preserve its "will" for the region, but an unarmed
one. This is important, because what we are seeking here is long-term stability for Central America.
We cannot accept...a process of continual confrontations, of misunderstanding. Risks on that side
are greater than those involved in a peace plan. We have not conceded the revolutionary process
by signing the agreements. Press freedom and the free functioning of political parties, for instance,
are established in the country's constitution. We have never said that Nicaragua is going to be a
one-party country...That was a fabrication by the Reagan administration. Reagan, the CIA, the
US Embassy here, and rightwing forces in the US are going to try to take advantage of [the peace
process] to destabilize our government, not to create an atmosphere of political debate... What is our
insurance policy against this risk? Our trust in the people's support. We have never doubted that
support. With it, we have been able to win the war, and now we can win peace. PL: One of the most
hotly debated issues at present is amnesty. Who is to be covered by the amnesty? Ramirez: Amnesty
is not a popular issue in Nicaragua... We cannot consider all the emotional angles to amnesty, but
are obligated to implement an amnesty to meet the objectives of the peace plan... PL: Will those who
accept amnesty receive full political rights, such as running for political office? Ramirez: If (Adolfo)
Calero, or (Alfonso) Robelo, or any other contra chief returns to the country, accepts amnesty,
and resumes a peaceful life, s/he can form a political party or join an existing one. There are no
restrictions in this regard. PL: As long as the Sandinista Front wins elections and stays in power,
some will continue to say that democratization has not occurred in Nicaragua. Ramirez: These kinds
of allegations are not going to end, regardless of what we do to fulfill the electoral provisions of the
peace accord. The problem for the Reagan administration is precisely that the Sandinista Front is
in power. We are not so naive that we believe the US will accept any "democratization" other than
our leaving the political stage. But we prefer to discuss this problem among unarmed people... PL:
Are the other Central American countries genuinely willing to accept a future electoral victory by
the Sandinistas, that they are in power because they enjoy support by a majority of Nicaraguans?
Ramirez: Although some in Central America may not like it, if we win the elections they will have no
other choice but to accept our victory. We are not going to meddle with other elected governments,
whether we like them or not. The party who wins has state power as a government, and this is the
one we must understand and seek to have stable relations with. My forecast is this: We are not going
to interfere in the internal affairs of other Central American countries, nor are they going to interfere
in ours. This is the basis of stability, and I believe it was made very clear in the Guatemala peace
accord. The peace plan speaks of fair electoral processes in line with each country's constitution. The
Reagan administration does not recognize Nicaragua's constitution or laws, demanding immediate
elections, apparently on the assumption that the Sandinista Front would lose. Similar demands
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are not delivered to other Central American nations, they are not requested to contravene their
respective constitutions and legislation. (Basic data from PRENSA LATINA, 09/29/87)

-- End --
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